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foreign insurance company, this privilege would seem to operate to invalidate the tax.
56 Sup. Ct. 252, 260. Such indirect relief to foreign insurance companies has already
been afforded them under the due process clause. St. Louis Compress Co. v. Arkansas,
260 U.S. 346 (1922). Similarly, upon objection by an individual, any foreign corporation which could show that its business was the exercise of a privilege within this clause
apparently would be relieved from a discriminatory tax levied on the individual for his
part in the transaction. The court limited the breadth of this holding, however, by
another part of its decision; a tax was sustained which imposed upon income received
from stock in corporations which paid an income tax to the state a lighter burden than
upon income from stock in corporations which did not pay such a tax. 56 Sup. Ct. 252,
255. The fact that the corporation which was not taxed locally might pay an income
tax in other states was held immaterial. (Kiddv. Alabama, 188 U.S. 730 (1903)). The
resulting discrimination in favor of investors in corporations doing business within the
state appears to be a more serious restraint on extra-state investments than the discrimination which was condemned. Cf. FarmersLoan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280
U.S. 204 (1930). On this issue, however, the court apparently deemed itself bound by
prior decisions.
Corporations-Uniform Stock Transfer Act-Negotiation of Stock Certificates by
Means of Separate Blank Power-[Massachusetts].-The plaintiff authorized his
broker to pledge stock not yet owned by the plaintiff, and for that purpose assigned and
delivered to the broker several powers of attorney which were blank except for the
plaintiff's signature. The plaintiff also gave the broker a document called a "permission to pledge" any security owned by himself or the broker. Using the above stock
powers, the broker wrongfully pledged with the defendant bank other shares which
the plaintiff had previously deposited, unindorsed, with the broker for safekeeping.
The defendant bank filled in the powers to designate the shares wrongfully delivered
to it. The plaintiff sued to restrain any sale of the pledged stock by the bank and to
compel redelivery of the certificates. Held, for the defendant. But apart from the "permission to pledge" which was held to include authority to fill in the blank stock powers, there could not be a valid negotiation of the unindorsed certificates by means of a
separate stock power which was blank as to the name of the stock under § i(b) of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act (2 Mass. Gen. L. (1932), c. 155, § 3 7(b)). Edgerly v. First
Nat'l Bank of Boston, 197 N.E. 518 (Mass. 1935).
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act provides in § i that title to stock certificates may
be passed (b) "By delivery of the certificate and a separate document containing a
written assignment of the certificate or a power of attorney to sell, assign or transfer
the same or the share represented thereby, signed by the person appearing by the
certificate to be the owner of the shares represented thereby. Such assignment or power of attorney may be either in blank or to the specified person." The last sentence
appears to refer only to naming of the transferee and affords no legitimate inference as
to whether stock powers not describing the shares were contemplated. Nevertheless,
the court held that under this section a stock power must purport to assign designated certificates or shares. Although § i of the Uniform Act purports to state the
"only" methods by which legal title may be transferred (6 U. L. A. § 1 (1922)), the
framers of the act may have meant to except common law estoppel under § 18 (6
U.L.A. § 18 (1922)) which states that in cases not provided for by the act, the common
law and law merchant shall remain in effect. Even if no express exception was in-
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tended, the Uniform Act was not intended to restrict transfers of stock but rather to
make certificates more "negotiable" than they were at common law. Commissioners'
Note, 6 U.L.A. § 5 (1922). Therefore, blank stock powers should be no less effective
under the Uniform Act than they formerly were.
At common law, where the owner placed unindorsed stock certificates accompanied
by a stock power completely filled in, in the hands of another to dispose of them for a
prescribed purpose, and the agent, disregarding instructions, pledged them for his own
use, the owner was estopped to deny the pledgee's lien if the latter acted in good faith.
Baker v. Davie, 211 Mass. 429, 97 N.E. 1094 (1912); Smith v. Savin, 14I N.Y. 315, 36
N.E. 338 (1894). Thus two elements were necessary to make such a transfer valid:
an "intrusting of possession" by the owner and "apparent authority" to transfer,
arising from the words of the stock powers. Some courts found that a commercial custom existed of using stock powers totally blank except for the owner's signature and
expressly declared that such a power constituted a blanket authority from the owner
for all subsequent holders of the stock certificates to fill in the stock powers. Prall v.
Tilt, 28 N.J. Eq. 479 (1877); Wood's Appeal, 92 Pa. 379 (i88o). However, in those
cases, the power, though blank, was intended by all parties to represent the certificates
for which it was used. Another court reached the same result even where, as in the instant case, the blank power, given to the agent to transfer one stock certificate, was
used by the agent to transfer another. The court found full apparent authority in the
agent but admitted that since the agent used the power with the wrong shares there
was less negligence or "holding out" by the real owner of the shares transferred. Talcott
v. StandardOil Co., 134 N.Y.S. 617, 149 App. Div. 694 (1912). One judge dissented,
saying there was no apparent authority in the agent for the reason, inter alia, that the
power did not purport to relate to the shares transferred. Still other courts without
discussion have applied the doctrine of estoppel even though the separate stock power
did not name the shares to be transferred. Crawford v. DollarSavings Fund and Trust
Co., 236 Pa. 2o6, 84 At. 694 (1912); Fidton Nat'l Bank v. Moody, 179 S.E. 831 (Ga.
App. i935). The Uniform Stock Transfer Act abolishes the requirement that the agent
be trusted with possession and thus seems to nullify any objection to any use of stock
powers by a holder whether authorized or not. 6 U.L.A. § 5 (1922). Hence mere physical possession is sufficient unless the failure of a stock power to designate any certificate will customarily put a transferee on notice of a holder's lack of authority to transfer the unindorsed certificate. Formerly the New York Stock Exchange Rules required
not only that stock powers contain a full description of the certificates to be transferred
but also that such description be in the same writing as the owner's signature. Christy,
Transfer of Stock io5 (1929). But those rules are no longer in effect. Many brokers
use the device of unindorsed certificates accompanied by blank powers for convenience
in disposing of collateral on short notice. The broker can hold the certificates unindorsed for safe keeping and on oral instructions deal with any or all of an owner's stock
simply by filling in a blank power from the owner. It is convenient also to the owner,
who leaves his stock only temporarily with another, to be able to destroy the power at
the end of the period and thus not run the risk of theft or loss of indorsed certificates.
The decision in the instant case would enable an owner to protect his rights against
a subsequent wrongful pledge by his broker by deliberately omitting the name of the
stock in the separate power-a protection he would not have if he simply indorsed the
certificate in blank. Jenkins v. Continental Trust Co., 15O Md. 416, 133 At. 6io (1926);
Connolly v. People'sState Bank, 260 Mich. 352, 244 N. W. 500 (1932). And in the light
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of the business custom mentioned above, innocent purchasers would, nevertheless, accept such blank powers as effecting valid negotiations of the accompanying certificates
and thus be misled to their detriment, especially where the power is presented to them
after being filled in by the broker.
Equity-Misapplication of the Doctrine of Affirmative Mutuality in Statute of
Frauds Cases-The Purchaser's Part Performance as Basis for Specific Performance
for the Vendor-[New York].-The plaintiff promised orally to sell real estate to the
defendant who entered into possession, paid part of the purchase price and made improvements on the property. The vendor sought specific performance of the contract.
The defendant contended that the oral contract was unenforceable because of the
Statute of Frauds. Held, the defense failed; although the doctrine of affirmative mutuality was inapplicable, the purchaser's long possession and the changes he had made in
the property entitled the vendor to specific performance. Walter v. Hofman, 267 N.Y.
365, i96 N.E. 291 ('935).
If the purchaser under an oral contract to buy land can show certain acts of part
performance, he can enforce the contract despite the Statute of Frauds. Fry, Specific
Performance § 588 (6th ed. 1921); Pomeroy, Specific Performance § io5 (3 d ed. 1926).
Shall the vendor be entitled to specific performance if the purchaser's acts of part performance would have entitled him to the same relief? In a few states, the answer has
been a categorical "no." Palumbo V.James, 266 Mass. i, 164 N.E. 466 (1929); Bennett
v. Dyer, 89 Me. 17, 35 Atl. xoo4 (1896); Huntington & K. Land Development Co. v.
Thornburg, 46 W.Va. 99, 33 S.E. io8 (1899). In other jurisdictions, the vendor has
been allowed to rely on the purchaser's acts and has been granted the remedy of specific
performance. Andrew v. Babcock, 63 Conn. 109, 26 AtL. 7,5 (1893); Witt v. Boothe, 98
Kan. 554, 158 Pac. 85i (igi6); Tatum v. Brooker, 51 Mo. 148 (1872); Fay'sEstate, 213
Pa. St. 428, 62 Atl. 991 (19o6). These decisions are understandable in the light of the
rationale behind the doctrine of part performance. Some courts look upon the Statute
of Frauds as having been designed to avert proof of a non-existent contract by perjury
and fraud. Consequently, it is argued, if the parties' acts can be reasonably explained
only by the existence of a transaction relating to the land in dispute so that there is
cear and convincing evidence of the contract, the policy behind the statute is not disturbed by permitting specific performance. Bradley v. Loveday, 98 Conn. 3,5, rig Atl.
147 (1922); Keatts v. Rector, i Ark. 391 (1839); Price v. Hart, 29 Mo. 171 (1859);
Burns v. McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230, 135 N.E. 273 (1922). Since the policy is saved by
proof of such acts, it should be immaterial whether the plaintiff's or the defendant's
acts furnished the required evidence--the acts of either party should be sufficient to
entitle both parties to specific performance; in fact, the defendant's acts are even more
desirable proof of the transaction than are the plaintiff's. Other courts in order to justify going behind the Statute of Frauds to grant specific performance require that the acts
must not only be unequivocably referable to the contract, but, in addition, that the
plaintiff must have experienced such an irreparable change of position in reliance on
the contract that in order to prevent hardship, relief should be afforded him. Shaver v.
Wickmire, 335 Ill. 46, i66 N.E. 458 (1929); Hudgins v. Thomason, io9 Tex. 433, 211
S.W. 586 (i919); Kennedy v. Audersmt, 49 Wash. 14, 94 Pac. 66r (19o8). Where this
view is accepted, part performance by the purchaser may be regarded as having
changed the vendor's position, since the purchaser's acts usually involve a change in
the land-a change which the vendor should not be compelled to accept by a denial of

